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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce . action which was filed by the 
plaintiff/respondent, hereinafter referred to as the respondent, 
on October 31, 1984. The parties had been married approximately 
ten years before the Complaint was filed and had four children of 
the marriage. The parties entered into a Temporary Stipulation 
and Agreement which was aifnws on October 30, 1984 and filed with 
the Court on November 6, 1984. (R. 12) After the Stipulation, 
the parties filed numerous affidavits and motions with the Court 
which resulted in the Court entering five separate interim Orders 
on March 28, 1985; April 18, 1985; May 8, 1985; May 9, 1985; and 
October 28, 1985. On November 5, 1985 a trial was had on this 
matter which continued for five days and concluded on November 
14, 1985. (81-82, 83-84, and 141) During the trial 25 witnesses 
were called and 39 exhibits were entered. (R. 177-179, 181-184, 
189-194) The Court took the matter under advisement and entered 
its ruling on November 20, 1985. The transcript of the Court's 
ruling consists of eight pages. (R. 195, 202-210) A motion for 
a new trial was filed by the appellant on the 8th day of January, 
1986, which motion was denied on March 6, 1986. (R. 226, 
288-290) The respondent filed an Order to Show Cause on the 7th 
day of March, 1986 with a supporting affidavit and both parties 
filed memoranda pertaining thereto. The Court entered its 
Findings, Conclusions, and Order on said Order to on the 20th day 
of May, 1986. (R. 292-294, 328-343, 441-446) A notice of appeal 
was filed on May 5, 1986, and a request for a transcript was 
filed with the Court on May 14, 1986. (R. 428, 437) A 
transcript was not obtained and provided to this Court. 
The appeal of the appellant was from the Decree of Divorce 
entered by the Court and from the Order of the Court denying the 
defendant's motion for a new trial. On the 25th day of August, 
1986, the appellant filed a motion before the Supreme Court 
asking to augment the record on appeal by filing a copy of the 
child custody report made by Dr. McVaugh and a copy of the Barry 
J. Koerpel Professional Corporation Defined Benefit Plan. This 
motion was denied by the Supreme Court on September 15, 1986. On 
the 5th day of November, 1986, the respondent filed a motion to 
dismiss the appellant's appeal on the basis that a transcript had 
not been obtained as required by Rule 11 (e)(1) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. On December 15, 1986, the Supreme Court 
denied the respondent's motion to dismiss the appeal but ruled 
that "...the court limits the appellant's issues on appeal to 
those of law only and does so on the representation of counsel 
that no issue of fact has been raised...." 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff/respondent, Judith A. Koerpel, hereinafter 
referred to as the respondent, married Barry Jon Koerpel, the 
defendant/appellant, hereinafter referred to as the appellant, on 
March 1, 1974 in Wisconsin. The parties have four children of 
this marriage. Two of the children were born before their 
marriage and were adopted. The other two children were born 
after the marriage. The oldest child, Kimberly, turned 18 years 
old on August 5, 1985, prior to the divorce hearing. Melanie 
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will turn 18 years of age on November 9, 1987, Joshua was five 
years of age at the time of the divorce hearing in November of 
1985 and Bradin .was three years of age. 
The appellant is a doctor specializing in kidney diseases 
with a practice in the Weber County area. The respondent was 
employed part time at the time of the divorce hearing in this 
matter. 
The parties have been involved in a divorce action since 
the 30th day of October, 1984. Numerous motions, order to show 
causes and affidavits had been filed by the parties prior to the 
time this matter came to trial. Those motions primarily involved 
the financial businesses and affairs of the parties which were 
numerous. The parties had originally entered into a stipulation 
on October 30, 1984 and Judge Ronald Oc Hyde, in an Order to Show 
Cause ruling on the 18th of April, 1985, indicated that the 
parties were in a financial mess that he was not able to resolve 
with the evidence presently before him and awarded temporary 
custody of the children to the respondent. (R. 12, 63-67) The 
respondent attempted to determine the assets of the parties by 
motions to produce records and depositions of the appellant. The 
appellant failed to cooperate and to conform to the request. 
Consequently, the respondent incurred significant cost in 
subpeonaing records and other information for the trial with the 
purpose of attempting to determine the financial assets of the 
appellant. (R. 289) 
The trial of this matter took five days, involved 25 
separate witnesses, and 39 exhibits. Two psychologists testified 
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in this matter concerning the custody of the children. Dr. 
McVaugh, based upon test results, made a mild recommendation in 
favor of the appellant. (R. 208) Dr. Furlong recommended that 
the children remain with the respondent. Approximately four 
other witnesses were called by the respondent to testify as to 
her ability to care for the children and approximately three 
witnesses were called by the appellant to support his claim for 
custody. (R. 177-179, 181-184, 189-195) 
Both parties called accountants to testify concerning 
their assets and liabilities and numerous lay witnesses to 
testify as to certain aspects of their finances. The 
respondent's accountant, Roger Nuttall, introduced accounting 
records identified as Exhibits 17, 18, and 19 and back up 
material supporting those exhibits identified as Exhibit 23. The 
appellant's accountant, Tanner/Brunson Company, prepared Exhibits 
30 and 31. One of the assets was a Barry J. Koerpel Professional 
Corporation Defined Benefit Plan. That plan was valued by the 
Court at $236,104.00. (R. 203) The appellant represented that 
the plan contained approximately $113,770.62 held with Merrill 
Lynch. In fact, the moneys with Merrill Lynch were not held in 
the name of the Barry J. Koerpel Professional Corporation Defined 
Benefit Plan, but was held in the personal name of Dr. Koerpel. 
At the time of the hearing on the motion for a new trial, the 
respondent filed with the Court as Exhibit 1, photocopies of a 
check from Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith dated 
November 7, 1985, made out to Barry J. Koerpel, M.D. in the sum 
of $87,881.00. The funds were then deposited with the 
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Professional Pension Services, Inc. through Utah First Bank 
sometime thereafter. (R. 406) The appellant also filed with the 
Court Exhibit 2 which was a record from Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner and Smith indicating that Barry J. Koerpel, M.D. as of 
October 26, 1985, had $114,421.85 in his personal account. That 
a withdrawal in the sum of $87,881.00 had been made leaving a 
closing balance as of November 29, 1985 in the sum of $26,855.42. 
(R. 407) At the end of the first day of trial in this matter, on 
November 5, 1985, the District Court Judge entered an order 
restraining both parties from disposing of any of the assets 
during the pendency of the trial. (R. 179) 
The trial judge took the matter under advisement for a 
period of six days and entered its order from the bench on 
November 20, 1985. (R. 195) The Court concluded that the 
evidence concerning the finances in many cases was not very clear 
and that the net assets of the parties amounted to $346,884.00 
and that the respondent was entitled to one-half of those assets 
in the sum of $173,424.00. The Court also concluded that the 
appellant was the moving force behind all of the business 
ventures and that he should inherit the business assets and all 
business liabilities because he was in a better position to 
handle the liabilities and assets. The Court also observed that 
the appellant at all times had the means to determine the actual 
state of his affairs. The Court awarded to the respondent the 
household furnishings with an assigned value of $45,000.00, the 
automobiles with a value of $20,900.00, a note receivable with 
the value of $9,022.00, and $100,000.00 from the Merrill Lynch 
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account. All of the rest of the assets, including those 
contained in the Defined Benefit Plan and the Professional 
Corporation were awarded to the appellant along with the 
liabilities incurred by the parties. (R. 202-207, 211-214) 
The Court concluded from the evidence that the respondent 
should be awarded the care, custody, and control of the minor 
children subject to rights of visitation in the appellant. The 
Court considered the moral character of both parents, the 
emotional stability of the parents, personal vs. surrogate care 
of the minor children by the parents, the lack of evidence of any 
drug or alcohol abuse on the part of either party, the religious 
compatibility of the parties, the financial conditions of the 
parties, and the importance of keeping siblings together. The 
Court determined that the controlling factors in this case were 
the psychological tests which resulted in a mild recommendation 
for the appellant, the fact that the respondent was the primary 
care provider during most of the children's lives, and the 
continuing of the previous custody arrangements where it seems to 
be working. The Court stated that it felt that the respondent 
being the primary care provider and the continuation of the 
previous custody arrangements over weighed the mild 
recommendation in favor of the appellant by the psychological 
tests. (R. 207-208, 214-215) 
The appellant filed a motion for a new trial on January 9, 
1986, asking the Court to grant a new trial or in the alternative 
to take additional testimony and to amend its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Divorce Decree on the grounds that 
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insufficient evidence existed to justify the Court's decision. 
(R. 226) Affidavits, memoranda, and argument were presented to 
the Court on the Motion for New Trial. On March 6, 1986, the 
Court entered the Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and an 
Order on the Motion for a New Trial. The Court found that 
neither of the parties were unfit as parents and that the 
respondent had been the primary care provider during the marriage 
and had custody of the children from the time the Divorce 
Complaint was filed until the hearing. The Court concluded that 
the information presented at the trial was not sufficient to 
cause the Court to transfer the custody of the children from the 
primary care provider. The Court also found that the appellant 
had failed to cooperate with the plaintiff in her attempt to 
discover information concerning the property of the parties and 
that the appellant had ample opportunity to discover the status 
of his properties and liabilities and to have provided that 
information at the time of the trial. The Court concluded that 
there was no basis for excusable error or neglect on the part of 
the appellant in not knowing the nature and value of the 
properties he had acquired during the marriage. (R. 288-289) 
The appellant appealed from the denial of a motion for a 
new trial. However, the appellant in his brief does not pursue 
that appeal and in his Brief states he only appeals the Findings 
of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce entered by 
Judge Roth. 
No evidence was presented at the time of the trial to the 
effect that a Defined Benefit Plan had been created in accordance 
7 
with the Internal Revenue Code as represented by the appellant in 
his brief under Findings of Facts, Paragraph 2. During the 
trial, the appellant did not raise the issue of whether or not 
the Court could award to the respondent part of the Defined 
Benefit Plan. This issue was addressed for the first time by the 
Court in an Order to Show Cause filed by the respondent to 
enforce collection of the $100,000.00. The appellant claimed the 
Court could not enforce the order. The Findings of the District 
Court which are referred to in the appellant's Brief under 
Statement of Facts, Paragraph 4, are those entered by Judge Roth 
on May 20, 1986, pursuant to the Order to Show Cause which was 
filed by the respondent. In that Order the Court stated: 
That the Court has considered the argument of the 
defendant, that the Employment Retirement Security 
Act (ERISA) prohibits the Court from transferring 
the money held in the Merrill Lynch money market 
certificates to the plaintiff because it is not a 
qualified domestic relations order. The Court has 
reviewed the law on this matter and finds that the 
federal act does not prohibit the Court from 
exercising its personal jurisdiction in ordering 
him to terminate the plan. The Court finds that 
the plan can be voluntarily terminated by Dr. 
Koerpel and that the Court has the authority to 
hold him in contempt if he fails to terminate the 
plan and turn over the money as previously 
ordered (R. 442-443) 
The appellant did not appeal from the Order on Order to Show 
Cause, and consequently the issues raised in the Order to Show 
Cause and the decision of the Court are not properly before this 
Court for review. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING THE 
RESPONDENT CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILDREN 
This Court has ruled that the appellant is restricted to arguing 
issues of law because he failed to provide a transcript of the 
lower Court's proceedings. It is the respondent's position that 
the request of the appellant that this Court overturn the lower 
Court's decision in awarding custody of the children is primarily 
an issue of fact and may not be pursued at this time in light of 
the Supreme Court's ruling. The respondent also contends that 
the lower Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding custody 
of the minor children to the respondent. That the facts and 
evidence submitted in the lower Court adequately supported and 
compelled that decision by the trial judge. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR BY INEQUITABLY DIVIDING 
THE ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF THE PARTIES 
The respondent contends that this issue is one of fact and 
not one of law. The appellant did not cite any law in his Brief 
supporting his request that the lower Court's decision concerning 
the liabilities and assets of the party be overturned. The lower 
Court received extensive evidence concerning the assets and 
liabilities of the parties and concluded that the appellant had 
failed to provide the necessary information in response to 
depositions and motions for discovery and had failed to 
adequately inform the Court of his liabilities and assets. The 
Court awarded to the appellant all assets and liabilities except 
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for the furniture, vehicles, a contract, and $100,000.00 cash 
held with Merrill Lynch. The respondent believes the Court 
ruling was supported by the evidence and was not an abuse of the 
Court's discretion. 
POINT III 
THE COURT'S ORDER AWARDING THE RESPONDENT $100,000.00 
OF THE SUM HELD IN THE MERRILL LYNCH MONEY MARKET 
WAS LEGAL AND SHOULD BE SUSTAINED BY THIS COURT 
The appellant contends that the Trial Court is prohibited 
by federal law from awarding $100,000.00 of the money held in 
Merrill Lynch Money Market to the respondent. The respondent 
contends that this issue was not raised during the trial of this 
matter, but was addressed by the Court in an Order to Show Cause 
filed thereafter. The appellant has not appealed the Court's 
ruling in the Order to Show Cause and consequently this matter is 
not properly before the Court. The respondent also contends that 
the money held in the Merrill Lynch Money Market account was held 
in the individual name of the appellant, Dr. Koerpel, and not in 
the name of the Pension and Profit Sharing Fund. Consequently, 
the federal law, if applicable, would have no effect upon the 
lower Court's decision. In the event this Court determines that 
the federal law is applicable, it does not prohibit the action 
taken by the Trial Court and cannot interfere with the personal 
jurisdiction the Court has over the individual and the right of 
the Trial Court to hold the appellant in contempt if he fails to 
voluntarily terminate the profit and pension sharing plan in 
order to withdraw the $100,000.00. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING THE 
RESPONDENT CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILDREN 
Rule 11(e)(2) U.R.A.P. states as follows: 
If the appellant intends to urge an appeal that a 
finding or a conclusion is unsupported by or is 
contrary to the evidence, he shall include in the 
record a transcript of all evidence relevant to 
such findings or conclusion. 
The appellant in the memorandum filed with this Court in response 
to the respondent's motion for dismissal stated that he was not 
claiming that the lower Court had committed error or made a 
finding unsupported or contrary to evidence. Based upon that 
representation, this Court ruled that the appellant does not have 
the right to argue any factual issues to support its appeal. 
Point II of the appellant's Brief which deals with the custody of 
the minor children specifically states that the Court abused its 
discretion in awarding the custody of the children to the 
respondent. It is the position of the respondent that in light 
of the Supreme Court's ruling there is no way the appellant can 
be allowed to continue to pursue this part of his appeal. 
The primary focus of the appellant's appeal concerning the 
custody of the children is that the Court committed error in the 
weight it placed upon the fact that the respondent had been the 
primary care provider for the children and that the evidence was 
not sufficient to move the children from the respondent's care 
into that of the appellant's. The parties did not make a big 
issue concerning the oldest minor child, Melanie, who turned 17 
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during the course of the trial. It was the feeling of the 
parties that she was old enough to live with whichever parent she 
elected. The main focus was on the custody of Joshua, who was 
five years of age, and Bradin, who was three years of age. The 
testimony given at the trial was undisputed that the respondent 
had been the primary care provider for these children from their 
birth until the time of the trial. The Court also considered the 
fact that these children had been living with the respondent from 
the beginning of the divorce action in October of 1984 until the 
time of the trial in November of 1985. The appellant complains 
that a temporary order of the Court should not have any bearing 
upon the long term determination of the custody. The appellant 
overlooks the fact that the parties entered into a temporary 
stipulation on the date the Divorce Complaint was prepared, 
October 30, 1984, wherein the appellant voluntarily agreed that 
the respondent could have the temporary care, custody, and 
control of the parties four minor children, subject to reasonable 
rights of visitation. (R. 12) The District Court later affirmed 
the temporary custody in the respondent. (R. 65) 
At the time of the trial, the Court determined from the 
evidence that the children had been cared for properly and had 
functioned well during the approximate one year that they had 
been in the temporary custody of their mother the respondent. 
The Court found that there was no reason to change the custody 
from the primary care provider to the appellant and concluded 
that there was no evidence to demonstrate that the appellant 
would be a superior parent to the respondent. The Court did find 
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that there was a mild recommendation by one of the psychiatrists 
based upon the psychological test administered by Dr. McVaugh, 
but that that mild recommendation did not over weigh the other 
considerations. It should be pointed out that a psychiatrist 
also testified in the trial on behalf of the respondent and 
recommended that she would be the fit and proper parent to have 
the permanent care, custody, and control of the minor children. 
The Court also heard seven other witnesses who testified 
concerning the fitness of both parents to raise the children. 
The Court gave due consideration to all of the issues including 
the moral character of both parents, the emotional stability of 
the parents, the personal vs. surrogate care of the minor 
children by the parents, the lack of evidence of any drug or 
alcohol abuse on the part of either party, the religious 
compatibility of the parties, the financial condition of the 
parties, and the importance of keeping the siblings together. 
(R. 207-209, 214-215) It was only after considering all of these 
issues that the Court concluded that neither parent was an unfit 
parent and that the welfare of the children would be best served 
by leaving them with the mother. 
This Court in the case of Wall v. Wall, 700 P. 2d 1124 
(Utah 1985) stated that where the evidence concerning custody 
could support an award of the children to either party, the 
Supreme Court would defer to the judgment of the Trial Court 
since the Trial Court is in a better position to assess the 
numerous considerations that must be determined in awarding 
custody of the children. It is the position of the respondent 
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that the Trial Court considered all of the relevant issues and 
there is no basis to support the conclusion that the Trial Court 
erred or abused its discretion in awarding the children to the 
respondent. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR BY INEQUITABLY DIVIDING 
THE ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF THE PARTIES 
The Court's attention is directed to the introductory 
remarks under Point I of this Brief which relate to the fact that 
since the appellant did not obtain a transcript of the 
proceedings of the lower Court under Rule 11(e)(2) U.R.A.P. the 
appellant should not be permitted to allege that the findings of 
the lower Court was unsupported by or contrary to the evidence. 
Point III of the appellant's Brief claims that the District Court 
erred by inequitable assigning the business liability to Dr. 
Koerpel, but does not argue any issue of law. 
Numerous witnesses, including two accountants, were called 
by the parties to testify as to the assets and liabilities 
incurred by the parties during their marriage. The respondent 
had made a diligent effort to discover the assets and liabilities 
of the parties, but had not obtained the cooperation of the 
respondent. Prior to the trial, the respondent was required to 
file a motion to compel the appellant to provide this 
information. (R. 99-101) On October 28, 1985, approximately one 
week before the trial, the Court entered an order that the 
parties must appear in the office of the respondent's attorney 
for deposition. (R. 141) The failure of the appellant to 
14 
provide the information previously requested made it necessary 
for the respondent to subpoena 19 separate parties to produce 
records at the time of the trial concerning the appellantfs 
financial affairs. (R. 145-176) The failure of the appellant to 
respond to the reasonable request for production of documents, 
caused the Court to conclude in its Order denying the appellant's 
motion for new trial that the appellant had failed to cooperate 
with the respondent in her attempts to discover information 
concerning the properties of the parties and that the defendant 
had ample opportunity to discover the status of his own 
properties and to have had that information available at the time 
of the trial* The Court further found that there was no basis 
for the appellant's contention that there was excusable error or 
neglect in him not knowing the full nature and value of the 
properties which he had acquired during the marriage. (R. 289) 
The fact of the matter is that the appellant claimed to be 
ignorant concerning the assets of the parties and refused to 
cooperate in producing the necessary information prior to the 
time of the trial. Even with the information which had been 
subpoenaed by the respondent, the Court found that on many of the 
issues the evidence was not very clear. (R. 206) The Court 
awarded the business assets and liabilities to the appellant 
because the appellant was the moving force behind the business 
ventures, and because 
...I think he is in a better position to handle the 
liabilities. He is in a better position to know 
what they are. I am also keeping in mind that in 
my opinion the defendant has at all times had the 
means to determine the actual state of his affairs. 
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I am not sure he has done so. In any event, he 
will be responsible for those now...,. (R. 206) 
The appellant in his Brief attempts to address the 
responsibility of the parties concerning the business assets and 
debts which were accumulated during the marriage. Since the 
appellant has not produced a transcript, he relies in part upon 
the affidavits and motions which have been filed prior to the 
divorce proceedings. It is the position of the respondent that 
those affidavits and motions cannot be relied upon in an appeal. 
Each affidavit which was filed by the appellant prior to the 
trial was opposed by an affidavit of the respondent. An 
affidavit may be relied upon by the Court in support of a motion 
if it is unopposed. However, when an affidavit is opposed by a 
countering affidavit then the Court must take testimony and allow 
direct and cross examination of the parties in order to determine 
the facts. There is no evidence before this Court that Judge 
Roth, the Trial Judge, ever read or considered' the affidavits 
that had been filed over a period of approximately one year in 
support of motions made prior to the trial. Judge Roth did 
receive extensive testimony during the trial and based upon the 
testimony and exhibits entered the property award which is being 
appealed by the appellant. All the parties who filed affidavits 
before the Court prior to the trial, were present in Court and 
presented testimony under oath. 
It is the position of the respondent that the Trial 
Court's decision was adequately supported by the testimony 
presented at the trial and should be upheld by this Court. 
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POINT III 
THE COURT'S ORDER AWARDING THE RESPONDENT $100,000.00 
OF THE SUM HELD IN THE MERRILL LYNCH MONEY MARKET 
WAS LEGAL AND SHOULD BE SUSTAINED BY THIS COURT 
This Court has ruled that the appellant may not argue 
issues of fact and is restricted on this appeal to issues of law 
only. The appellant contends that the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act commonly known as ERISA 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. 
prohibits the Trial Court from requiring the appellant to deliver 
$100,000.00 of the cash held with Merrill Lynch to the 
respondent. The appellant also claims that the Divorce Decree 
was not a qualified domestic relations order or a QDRO as 
required in 29 U.S.C. § 1056(D). 
The appellant did not raise these issues of the law before 
Judge Roth during the divorce trial. Reference to Judge Rothfs 
Memorandum Decision which consisted of eight pages will 
demonstrate that there is not a single reference made to the 
federal laws nor is there any indication that the Court has been 
called upon to make a decision as to whether or not the Court has 
the authority to distribute the assets that are allegedly 
contained in the Barry J. Koerpel Professional Corporation 
Defined Benefit Plan. (R. 202-210) Likewise, there is no 
reference to the federal acts or the ability of the Court to 
disburse assets allegedly held in the Defined Benefit Plan 
contained in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Divorce 
Decree which were prepared in this case. (Re 211-222) The 
record is devoid of any objection filed by the appellant and his 
counsel to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Divorce 
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Decree prepared in this matter. Had the Trial Court neglected to 
address an issue which had been introduced during the trial or 
had counsel for the respondent failed to included that 
information in the formal Findings, Conclusions, and Decree; the 
appellant and his counsel would have objected. The first time 
that the record demonstrates the appellant or his counsel raises 
the issues of the federal law is in a memorandum submitted in 
support of the appellant's request for a new trial. Paragraph 3 
of that memorandum states that the appellant had contemplated 
terminating the plan at the time of the trial. (R. 232) That 
memorandum then makes reference to the federal law concerning 
defined benefit plans. No where in the memorandum does the 
appellant contend that the federal issue had been raised during 
the trial and that the Court failed to give due consideration to 
it. The memorandum is clear that the issue is being raised for 
the first time on the motion for a new trial. (R. 232-234) The 
Trial Court, in its ruling on the motion for a new trial in 
Paragraph 3 of the Findings, stated that the Court would allow 
the appellant a hearing to address the issues concerning awarding 
part of the pension plans to the respondent. (R. 289) The 
appellant had the responsibility for setting the matter for a 
hearing. To date a hearing has not been requested on that issue 
pursuant to the ruling on the motion for a new trial. (R. 289) 
The ruling on the motion for a new trial was signed by the 
Judge Roth on the 6th day of March, 1986. On March 7, 1986 the 
respondent filed an Order to Show Cause asking in part that the 
appellant be compelled to deliver the $100,000.00. In response 
18 
to that Order to Show Cause, the appellant raised the issue of 
the federal acts and whether or not the Court could enforce the 
provision of the Divorce Decree awarding to the respondent part 
of the Defined Benefit Plan. A hearing was held on that matter 
and an Order was entered on May 20, 1986 by Judge Roth. In 
Paragraph 4 of the Findings, Judge Roth stated: 
That the Court has considered the argument of the 
defendant, that the Employment Retirement Security 
Act (ERISA) prohibits the Court from transferring 
the money held in the Merrill Lynch money market 
certificates to the plaintiff because it is not a 
qualified domestic relations order. The Court has 
reviewed the law on this matter and finds that the 
federal act does not prohibit the Court from 
exercising its personal jurisdiction in ordering 
him to terminate the plan. The Court finds that 
the plan can be voluntarily terminated by Dr. 
Koerpel and that the Court has the authority to 
hold him in contempt if he fails to terminate the 
plan and turn over the money as previously 
ordered (R. 442-443) 
The appellant has not appealed to this Court from the 
ruling of the Court on the respondent's Order to Show Cause dated 
May 20, 1986. While the appellant in his appeal did indicate he 
was appealing from the decision on the Motion for New Trial, on 
Page 1 of his Brief under Statement of Facts, the appellant 
states that he is only appealing from the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Divorce Decree entered by Judge Roth. 
Based upon the record referred to herein, the respondent contends 
that the issue of federal law and its impact on Judge Roth's 
Divorce Decree was not raised before the lower Court and cannot 
be raised for the first time before this Court. 
The appellant has consistently claimed that the 
approximately $114,421.00 held in the Merrill Lynch Money Market 
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Fund belonged to the Dr. Koerpel Professional Corporation Defined 
Benefit Plan. It should be noted that the Defined Benefit Plan 
is a plan supposedly created and operated by a professional 
corporation of Dr. Koerpel. As it turns outf the $114,421.00 was 
held in the personal name of Dr. Koerpel. After the Divorce 
Decree had been entered in this matter and prior to the hearing 
on the appellant's motion for a new trial, the respondent cause a 
subpoena to be served upon Merrill Lynch. As a result of that 
subpoena a copy of a check made out to the appellant was produced 
which demonstrated that the funds held with Merrill Lynch were 
held in the individual name of the appellant and not in the name 
of the Professional Corporation or the Defined Benefit Plan. (R. 
406-407) The check demonstrates that on November 1, 1985, a 
check was made out to Dr. Koerpel, the appellant, in the sum of 
$87,881.00 and that check was deposited with Professional Pension 
Services on the 7th day of November, 1985. The balance of the 
sum was retained by Merrill Lynch under the name of the 
appellant, Dr. Koerpel. The transfer of these funds was a direct 
violation of a restraining order that was issued by the Trial 
Court on November 5, 1985 restraining the disposal of any assets 
during the pendency of the trial. The appellant did not disclose 
the manner in which the funds were held nor that the funds were 
being transferred during the trial of this matter. In the Order 
on Order to Show Cause entered on May 20, 1986, referred to by 
the appellant in his Brief the Court found that at the beginning 
of the divorce trial in this matter, the appellant held the money 
with Merrill Lynch Money Market Certificate in his individual 
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name; that two days after the beginning of the trial, the 
appellant transferred a substantial part of that money into the 
Dr. Koerpel Professional Corporation Defined Benefit Plan and 
that there was a restraining order in effect at that point in 
time. (Re 442) 
The appellant claims that the Trial Court could not 
legally disburse the assets belonging to the Pension Plan. That 
Pension Plan was set up by a professional corporation and not by 
the appellant as an individual. At no time has the appellant 
demonstrated that the $114,421.00 was a corporate asset which 
could be placed in the Pension and Profit Sharing Plan. It is 
the position of the respondent that the appellant cannot 
disregard the corporate entity and insist that an asset held in 
his personal name is in fact a corporate asset and therefore 
should be part of a corporate pension and profit sharing plan. 
The appellant contends that he cannot be ordered by the Court to 
deliver the funds to the respondent and held in contempt of court 
for failing to do so. The Utah District Court has an inherent 
power of equity to exercise personal jurisdiction over an 
individual and to order that individual to conform with a 
specific Court Order. (Herzog vs. Bramel, (1933) 82 U.216, 23 
P.2d 345 
The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Kessimakis vs. 
Kessimakis, 520 P.2d 1090 (1978), stated as follows: 
The Court has the power to find a person in 
contempt of the authority of the court for 
disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or 
process. Disobedience of a valid, lawful order, in 
proper form and regularly entered in a divorce 
case, is a contempt of court. On appeal, Dale 
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claims an absence of the elements of willfulness 
and ability to pay- The defense of inability to 
comply with the court order is only effective where 
the person charges exercises due diligence towards 
compliance. The trial court specifically found 
Dale to have refused, failed and neglected to pay 
the obligations imposed by the earlier judgment, 
signifying a lack of due diligence. The trial 
court has considerable discretion in determining 
the penalty for contempt which decision we are 
herein inclined to affirm, particularly in view of 
the fact that Dale has been afforded a means by 
which he may purge himself of the contempt found. 
If this Court were to conclude that the moneys in the 
Merrill Lynch Money Market account were the property or assets of 
the Defined Benefit Plan rather than the assets of the appellant, 
the appellant has the right under the plan and under federal law 
to voluntarily terminate the plan. (R. 443) The federal law 
pertaining to Domestic Relations Orders or QDROs as set forth in 
29 U.S.C. § 1056 (D) states as follows: 
(D) A Domestic Relations Order meets the 
requirements of this subparagraph only if such 
order—(i) does not require a plan to provide a 
type of form of benefit, or any option not 
otherwise provided under the plan... 
The plan involved in this case can be voluntarily terminate by 
the appellant and the appellant intended to terminate the Plan 
prior to the Divorce Decree. (R. 232) Consequently, the Court's 
Order that the appellant withdraw from the Plan $100,000.00 to 
pay to the respondent and if necessary terminate the plan, does 
not violate the federal law and is a qualified Domestic Relations 
Order. 
The United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, in 
the case of Savings and Profit Sharing Fund of Sears Employees v. 
Rudolph G. GAGO, 717 F.2d 1045 (1983) addressed issues similar to 
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those now before this Court, The lower Federal Court had ruled 
that a State Domestic Court's Order requiring that the 
defendant's retirement fund pay his spouse a portion of his 
retirement was not pre-empted or in conflict with the ERISA Act* 
The Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. The Court reviewed 
other Federal cases and concluded that the treatment given by 
Federal law to military retirement systems and the railroad 
retirement act was significantly different than a private pension 
or contribution program. The Court also recognized that 
Wisconsin was not a community property state, but concluded that 
since the state treated marital properties substantially the same 
as did community property states, there should be no distinction 
in the application of the Federal law to a non community property 
state. The Court specifically addressed those provisions of the 
ERISA Act prohibiting assignment or alienation of the benefits of 
a plan and 29 U.S.C. § 1056(D)(i). The Court concluded that 
those part of the Federal law did not pre-empt the decisions of a 
state domestic court. In addressing that issue, the Court stated 
in part as follows: 
Our uncertainty about Congress1 actual intent with 
respect to the impact of section 206 on property 
division need not lead to an impasse because the 
Supreme Court has instructed us that when courts 
face a potential conflict between state domestic 
relations law and federal law, the strong 
presumption is that the state domestic relations 
law is not pre-empted: 
fOn the rare occasion when state family law has 
come into conflict with a federal statute, this 
court has limited review under the Supremacy Clause 
to a determination whether Congress has "positively 
required by direct enactment" that state law be, 
pre-empted. A mere conflict in words is not 
sufficient. State family and family-property law 
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must do "major damage" to "clear and substantial" 
federal interests before the Supremacy Clause will 
demand that state law be overridden, 
* * * * * * * * * 
The approach must be practical,. ..The pertinent 
questions are whether the right as asserted 
conflicts with the express terms of federal law and 
whether its consequences sufficiently injure the 
objectives of the federal program to require 
nonrecognition.f 
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 281, 583, 
99 S.Ct. 802, 59 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979) (citations 
omitted). See also McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 220, 101 
S.Ct. 2728, 2735, 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1981) 
• • • • 
Since Congress has not spoken to the particular 
subject before us here and since we perceive no 
federal interest in ERISA that would require 
nonrecognition of Wisconsin's property distribution 
law, we think the presumption that the state 
domestic relations law is preserved is not 
rebutted." 
The Court recognized that a number of cases existed in which 
spousal maintenance and child support was no affected by the 
federal statutes and concluded that there was no distinction to 
be drawn between spousal maintenance and child support and a 
division of marital property. The appellant in this case claims 
that the domestic relations exception to the federal acts did not 
apply because the plan was not in a pay status. In addressing 
that issue, the Court stated in part as follows: 
"...Were we to address this point, however, we 
would find that the prerequisite to upholding the 
domestic relations exception s not strictly that 
the pension fund be in pay status (i.e., actually 
paying out benefits). Rather, the distinction is 
properly whether the beneficiary has a current 
right to the proceeds of the plan. In the case 
presently before us, the appellant had only to sign 
a withdrawal application directed to the fund in 
order to receive the proceeds of the plan...." 
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It should be noted that the defined benefit plan we are 
dealing with in this case is a contribution plan and not a 
pension plan. Consequently, there is no difficulty with whether 
or not the benefits are vested nor with whether or not they are 
in a pay status. The sums in the contribution plan can be 
withdrawn voluntarily by Dr. Koerpel as was the case in the 
federal case quoted above. (R. 443) If the Court concludes that 
the money held with the Merrill Lynch Money Market Fund is a 
valid asset of the contribution plan, then it seems that the case 
cited is directly on point and indicates that a state domestic 
court order is not pre-empted by ERISA or QDRO regulations of 
federal law. The appellant contends that the 1984 amendment to 
the ERISA act provided that a domestic relations order may not 
require a plan to provide any type of form of benefit not 
otherwise provided for by the plan. If that representation is 
correct, it does not change the rulings entered by the federal 
court cited above. The appellant had the right to terminate the 
plan and intended to terminate the plan prior to the Divorce 
Decree. (R. 232 & 443) Under any circumstances the federal law 
cannot prohibit a state court from exercising personal 
jurisdiction over an individual and finding that individual in 
contempt of court if he fails to comply with a reasonable order. 
In this case it is reasonable that the appellant take whatever 
action is necessary to withdraw the money from the Merrill Lynch 
account and distribute the money to the respondent as required. 
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It should also be noted that since the time of the Divorce 
Decree in this matter the appellant has complied with the order 
and has distributed to the respondent the $87,000•00 that was 
deposited with pension program on November 7, 1985. The 
respondent has also executed upon the Merrill Lynch account to 
acquire the additional moneys which were still held in the 
appellant's name. In essence the appellant is requesting the 
Court to enter an order that would require that the respondent 
deliver this money back to the appellant or to his pension and 
profit sharing program. The appellant elected not to file a 
supersedeas bond in this matter, and consequently could not 
prohibit the respondent from proceeding to execute on the 
judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The findings of the Trial Court wherein the respondent was 
awarded the custody of the minor children and the property 
acquired during the marriage was divided between the parties was 
amply supported by the evidence and was not contrary to the 
evidence submitted before the Trial Court. The appellant has 
been limited to arguing issues of law before this Court. The 
appellant has not cited any law in support of its contention that 
the custody and property distribution should be overturned that 
does not rely upon an argument of fact. The appellant, in his 
Brief, has contended that the Court committed prejudicial error 
in its decision, and since a transcript has not been provided may 
not under Rule 11(e)(2) U.R.A.P. be granted relief by the Supreme 
Court. 
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The appellant contends that the Trial Court cannot 
disburse assets belonging to a defined benefit plan because of 
the federal ERISA act. The respondent contends that this issue 
was not raised before the Trial Court in the divorce action, but 
was subsequently considered by the Trial Judge in an Order on 
Order to Show Cause. The Order on Order to Show Cause has not 
been appealed to this Court and the appellant may not raise this 
issue for the first time on appeal. The respondent also contends 
that the asset in question was held in the individual name of the 
appellant and was not an asset held by the Defined Benefit Plan. 
In the alternative, if the Court determines that the money was 
part of the Defined Benefit Plan, the Order of the Court did not 
violate the ERISA act and was a qualified Domestic Relations 
Order as specified by the federal law. In addition, the federal 
act cannot deprive the Trial Court of personal jurisdiction over 
the appellant nor the Court's authority to hold the appellant in 
contempt if he does not comply with the Court's Order. 
The respondent respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm the decision entered by the Trial Court Judge* 
Respectfully submitted this day of January, 1987. 
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD 
By 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Respondent 
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KOERPEL VS. KOERPEL November 20, 1985 Decision of Court 
10 
* THE COURT: For the record, this is Koerpel vs. Koerjpel 
2 it has been a hard case. I think think that's any secretL 
^ There have been many issues presented, and on many of the issues) 
4
 the evidence is not very clear. There are some issues that I 
5 simply cannot resolve. 
6 As far as finding fault or blame for failed businesses, 
7
 I don!t think that I can call that one way or the other. There 
8 evidence that both parties were living very well for a time. 
9 J They were involved in several businesses. The businesses faileq 
because of poor financial and business practices. 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
is 
H j There has been a suggestion that the defendant caused 
12 I the failure of some businesses, particularly the Meadows Dialysijs 
13 j Center. The evidence seems to be that he would have nothing 
14
 I to gain by doing that, much to lose. I can't really determine 
1£> I that he is to blame for the failure of the Meadows Dialysis 
Center by himself. I also think the evidence suggests that 
the plaintiff's position in that dialysis center was somewhat 
of an artificial one. 
If you have copies of Exhibit 17, maybe you could take 
those and follow through with me, and I can tell you what value^ 
I have placed on some of the assets and liabilities. 
Basically what I have done is I have used the value from 
the sources that in my opinion were in a better position to 
know what those values were. I hope I haven1t forgotten anything. 
The top of the list is cash $1,949.00. NObody disagrees with 
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1 that figure, so I assume that's accurate, and that is the figure) 
2 I am using. On the book value of $182,121.00 there is no 
3 dispute there. I will adjust that figure for accounts receivable 
4 of $26,629.00. That's the defendant's figure for accounts 
5 receivable. My thinking there is that due to the age of the 
6 accounts, and quite frankly due to the business practices that 
7 if he collects that much, he will be doing well. The next 
8 figure if $19,158.00. I am not using that. I am putting zero 
9 there. The total *then for the business is $189,599. 
10 Going down to the next item where I have numbers, Franklijn 
11 Grove Limited Partnership, find a value of $20,000.00, based on 
12 the plaintiff's witness's last testimony concerning that. 
13 Research Park Limited partnership, $6,060.00. The next item, 
14 automobiles, the same as listed. There is no dispute as to that] 
15 value. Land, there is no dispute as to that. Medical building, 
16 there is no dispute on that. I am leaving that the same. 
17 Equipment, there is no dispute as to that figure, I am leaving 
18 that the same. The note receivable, $3,000.00, there is no 
19 dispute as to that either. The Parkwest condominium number 40, 
20 i didn't put a value on it. As I understand it, that asset is 
21 no longer in existence as a condominium. Total $206,433.00. 
22 The pension plan, I am valuing at $236,104.00. That's tfcle 
2 3
 value that was placed on it by the defendant prior to cutting it] 
24 in half for taxes. And there is no information that I have at 
25 this point where I can determine there is going to be a fifty 
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1 percent tax liability on that, may or may not be. 
2 The personal residence I value at $300,000.00. I am told] 
3 that was sold at foreclosure sale. I don't know what result 
4 there was from that. I am not in a position to determine it is 
5 worth more at this time. 
g Household furnishing, $50,00.00. No dispute there. 
7 Property in NOrth Carolina $15,000.00, and there is 
8 no dispute as to that. 
g 10 percent contract receivable, $9,022.00, there is no 
10 dispute on that. 
H Property on Southwell, $21,300 value, the same on both 
12 of those. 
13 Healy property at $15,520, valued the same on both of 
14 those, so I am not changing that. 
15 Iron Blosson Condominium timeshare, zero value. 
16 Cash surrender life insurance policies $4,000.00 is 
17 the same. 
18 Total there is $414,842. Total Assets $1,048,927. 
19 The next page, liabilities. The first three numbers 
20 are the same, $162,000.00, $114,481.00, $35,144.00. There 
21 is no dispute as to those. 
22 The note payable, I am applying a value of $66,000.00 
23 to that. 
24 The next item, property taxes are the same. Construction 
25 amount due is the same. The $991.00 for the electric is the same 
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1 Franklin Grove Limited Partnership, the plaintiff has 
2 $25,000.00 there as a liability. The defendant has zero. I am 
3
 taking zero. 
4 MR. NEHRING: If I may interrupt, your Honor, I 
5 think if there is going to be an asset, there is going to be a 
6
 liability. The only reason ours was zero is we allocated no 
? asset value to it* 
8 THE COURT: It was my understanding on Franklin 
9 Grove that the $20,000.00 was the net figure. That was 
10 my understanding of the testimony on the final day. Mr. 
11 Nuttal said he had priced it, it was worth $45,000.00, it would 
12 have the liability against it of $25,000.00, which gives us 
13 $20,000.00, which is the figure. 
14 $3,45 2.00 for tanning beds. The obligation is the same. 
15 The same with the Wisconsin debt. Mortgage payable on the 
16 medical building is the same. All the remaining numbers there 
17 are the same. 
18 I have added into that legal fees, total $53,201.00 
X9
 And a debt to George Koerpel of $8,000.00. 
20
 J There is a liability to Humana Med First on the defendant) 
list of $32,337,00. I am disallowing that. 
I have total liability as $702,079.00. Net assets 
2 3
 $346,884.00 Half of that would be $173,424.00. 
24
 In determining how to distribute those assets, I have 
25 kept in mind some impressions from the evidence and one of 
21 
22 
's 
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1 those is that the defendant was in a position where he was 
2 ordered to make payments on the house, and for whatever reason 
3 failed to make payments. And it could be that he was not able 
4 to make the payments. So I will award him the house, plus all 
5 obligations against the house. And he is to hold the plaintiff 
g harmless from those. And those include the mortgages and the 
7 construction debt. 
8 I am also keeping in mind that in my opinion the defendant 
9 was the moving force behind all of the business ventures, so he 
will inherit,all business assets and all business liabilities. 
I think he is in a better position to handle the liabilities. 
12 I He is in a better position to know what they are. 
13 I am also keeping in mind that in my opinion the 
defendant has at all times had the means to determine the 
actual state of his affairs. I am not sure he has done so. 
16 I In any event, he will be responsible for those now. 
17 What I will do with regard to the assets then is award 
18 to the Plaintiff household furnishings with an assigned value o^ 
19 $45,000.00, the automobiles, with the exclusion of the one that 
20 the defendant has, with a value of $20,900.00, note receivable, 
21 ten percent note receivable, the value of $9,022.00 and 
22 $100,000.00 from the pension plan. 
23 She has some options there. She may take it all in 
24 cash, or she may take a note from McMasters. I believe that's 
25 been valued, discounted value at $47,000.00. That's the value 
14 
15 
206 
1 assigned by the defendant. If she elects to take the note and 
2 cash, she can have that note at her option. 
3 I don't know what you are going to do with that plan. If] 
4
 there is a way to distribute those and make it a non-taxable 
5 event, work it out any way you can. 
6 The toughest decision for me was the custody decision. 
7 I have been over Dr. McVaugh's report many times, and I have 
8 gone down through the list of the facts,that the Supreme Court 
9 suggests that I consider. Most of those come out as kind of 
10 ha wash. 
11 They talk about things like keepting siblings together. 
12 I don't see that as *a serious factor in this case. Moral characjter 
13 of both parents, I see that as coming out about even. Emotional] 
14 J stability of both parents, I see it as roughly even. Whether 
they can give personal versus surrogate care. In the past 
that's been pretty much even. I think in the future it could 
be that Plaintiff in this case is going to be in a better position 
to give personal care. 
No evidence of drug or alcohol abuse on the part of eithej 
party. Religious compatability does not seem to be a factor. 
Step parent status doesn't enter into it. Financial condition 
I don't think will be a factor by the time we are finished. 
What I do consider to be factors are the following: 
the fact that the psychological tests and the results favored 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25
 the defendant in this case is a definite factor, and is a plus 
9n>7 
1 for the defendant in this case, I see it as a—not as a strong 
2 recommendation for one or the other, but a mild recommendation. 
3 On the other side of that, on behalf of the plaintiff, 
4 I think that there is evidence that she was the primary care 
5 provider during most of the children's lives. And I think that 
6 there is some value in continuing the previous arrangement 
7 where it seems to be working. Those to me are more important 
8 factors than the results of the psychological tests. 
Q I am not satisfied that the' evidence shows the defendant 
would be a superior parent-at-all,. And .1 am not satisfied he 10 
H will be a superior parent to the extent that I should move the 
12 
13 
14 
children from where they are now into his custody. I am 
awarding custody to the plaintiff in this case. The defendant 
may have visitation every other weekend, 6:00 p.m. Friday to 
15 | 8:00 p.m. Sunday; alternate holidays, the Father's Day, whether 
16 I it falls'on his weekend or not. Plaintiff will have Mother's 
17 I Day whether it falls on her weekend or not. Have Christmas 
18 visitation 2:00 p.m. Christmas day for three days. Six weeks 
19 in the summer-
20 With regard to child support and alimony, I am not in a 
21 position to determine precisely what the defendant's income is 
22 at this point. For purposes of this, making this decision, 
23 I am assuming his income is $6,000.00 a month gross. With 
24 that in mind, support will be $1,170.00 for the children, and 
25 I will award alimony in the amount of $800.00 per month for 
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1
 an indefinite term, with the understanding that I am going to 
2 keep jurisdiction of this case. And any time during the next 
3 three years, when things stabilize, and when I say when things 
4
 stabilize, I am finding that both parties are in a position 
5 of financial instability at the present time, the plaintiff 
6 is going to have to go to work. There is no question about that). 
7 The defendant at this point—well, during the next three years 
8 I think is going to have to decide based upon the outcome of 
9 I his other trials, what his income is going to be and what kind 
of a future he has financially. So there may be room for 
11 modification on those awards during the next three years. 
12 And at any time that there appears to be either evidence 
13 that the situation has stabilized pretty much as it is now, or 
14 that there is a significant change, you can come in without 
15 showing a change of circumstances and have this reviewed. 
16 J With regard to attorney fees, each pay their own attorneyj 
fees and costs, with the following exception. The defendant 
will pay $3,000.00 towards the plaintiff's costs and attorney 
fees due to various delays during the discovery process caused 
by the defendant. 
I believe that's it. 
22 MR. ECHARD: You Honor, could I ask for clarification 
23 on a couple of matters? 
24 THE COURT; Alright. 
25 M R . ECHARD: You indicated the defendant assumed 
2°<) 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
1 all the businesses and the business liabilities. Does that 
2 include the tanning clinics? 
3 THE COURT: Everything. All businesses, all businesjs 
4 liabilities, they are his responsibility. Anything else? 
5 MR. ECHARD: No, your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: That means all the assets and that meansj 
7 that your client signs whatever documents are necessary 
8 transferring that to him. 
9 MR. ECHARD: Fine, I have nothing further. 
10 THE COURT: Mr. Nehring? 
11 MR. NEHRING: No. 
12 MR. ECHARD: I assume I prepare the order, your Honojr, 
13 J THE COURT: Yes. 
14 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JUDITH A. KOERPEL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BARRY JON KOERPEL, 
Defendant. 
BINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and 
ORDER 
u i v i l No. 90432 
LAW OFFICE OF 
jrridley, Echard 
&Ward 
635 - 25TH STREET 
)GDEN, UTAH 84401 
The defendant's motion for a new trial came on for hearing 
before the Honorable David E. Roth on the 29th day of January, 
1986, at 9:45 a.m. The plaintiff was represented in Court by her 
attorney, Robert A. Echard, and the defendant was present in 
Court an represented by his attorney, Ronald Nehring. The Court, 
having heard argument from the parties and being fully informed 
in the premises, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 . ihe Court found at the time of the trial that neither 
party was unfit and that the plaintiff had been the primary care 
provider during the marriage and had custody of the children from 
the time of the Divorce Decree until the time of the hearing. 
The Court considered all factors presented at the trial
 Aand 
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decided that the informa fion presented was not sufficient to 
cause the Court to transfer the custody from the primary care 
provider. 
2. The Court finds that the defendant failed to 
cooperate with the plaintiff in her attempts to discover 
information concerning the property of the parties. The 
defendant had ample opportunity to discover the status of his 
properties and to have had that information available at the time 
of the trial. The Court finds that there is no basis for 
excusable error or neglect in not knowing the nature and value of 
the property which had been acquired during the marriage. 
3. The Court will allow the defendant a hearing to 
address the defendant's issues concerning awarding part of the 
pension plan sums to the plaintiff. The defendant shall be 
responsible for setting this matter for a hearing, 
4. The defendant is restrained from disposing, 
transferring, or encumbering any of the funds held in the pension 
plan program until such time as a hearing can be had on this 
matter. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 . That the defendants motion for new trial should be 
denied. 
2. That a restraining order should be issued restraining 
the defendant from disposing of or transferring any assets held 
under the pension and profit sharing plan until a hearing can be 
had in this matter. 
9QQ 
LAW OFFICE OF 
ridley, Echard 
&Ward 
35 - 25TH STREET 
3DEN, UTAH 84401 
Page . 1 9 . 9 - 5 • • 
Indexed • . . 
ORDER 
1. That the defendant's motion for a new trial is 
denied. 
2. That the defendant is restrained from disposing of or 
transferring any of the assets held in the Barry J. Koerpel 
pension or profit sharing plan until further hearing on this 
matter. 
3t That the issue of attorney's fees for the motion for 
new trial is held in abeyance^y / 
DATED this <^P
 0f ^bruary, 1986. .-. - ' ,t 
&ttrri5rt'. ROTH 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order was mailed, postage prepaid, this 
"7 day of February, 1986, to Ronald E. Nehring, Esq., 424 East 
500 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JUDITH A, KOERPEL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BARRI JON KOERPEL, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AtfO ORDER 
Civil No. 90432 
The plaintiff fs Order to Show Cause came on for hearing 
before the Honorable David E. Roth at 11:00 a.m. on the 21st day 
of April, 1986. The plaintiff was present in Court represented 
by her attorney, Robert A. Echard* The defendant was not present 
in Court, but was represented by his attorney Ronald Nehring. 
The Court having received a proffer of evidence from the parties, 
having heard argument from the parties, and being fully informed 
in the premises, now therefore, makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the defendant is delinquent in child support 
through the 21st day of April, 1986, in the sum of $217.00 which 
represents sums he has withheld from child support fo*L the 
periods of time during which he has visited with thej^inor* 
children. 
AAA 
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That the defendant his f&iisa 'to return the children 
according to the previous Court Order concerning visitation and 
that Order should remain in full force and effect and if the 
defendant fails to pick up the children within one hour of the 
time ordered by the Court, then the plaintiff may assume he will 
not exercise his visitation rights. That the defendant shall 
return the children at the time set in the original Divorce 
Decree, 
3. That the Court finds that at the beginning of the 
Divorce trial in this matter the defendant held approximately 
$112,000.00 in a Merrill Lynch Money Market Certificate in the 
defendants individual name. That the defendant claimed that 
said funds were part of a pension and profit sharing plan and on 
approximately November 7$ 1985i two days after the beginning of 
the trial in this matter transferred a substantial part of that 
money into the Dr. Koerpel Professional Corporation Defined 
Benefit Plan. That at the time there was a restraining order in 
effect which as issued by the Court at the end of the first day 
of trial on November 5f 1985. 
4. That the Court has considered the argument of the 
defendant, that the Employment Retirement Security Act (ERISA) 
prohibits the Court from transferring the money held in the 
Merrill Lynch Money Market Certificate to the plaintiff because it 
is not a qualified domestic relations order. The Court has 
reviewed the law on this matter and finds that the Federal act 
does not prohibit the Court from exercising its personal 
jurisdiction over Dr. Koerpel in ordering him to terminate the 
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plan. The Court f i n d s that the plan can be V o l u n t a r i l y terminated 
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by Dr. Koerpel and that the Court has the authority to hold him 
in contempt if he fails to terminate the plan and turn over the 
money as previously ordered. The defendant shall take whatever 
actions are necessary to turn over said sums to the plaintiff 
within 30 days which shall be by May 21, 1986. That if it 
becomes necessary to terminate the pension and profit sharing 
plan in order to comply with the Court's Order, then the 
defendant must do so. 
5. That there should be approximately $25,000.00 held in 
the Merrill Lynch Money Market account in the name of Dr. 
Koerpel. That the plaintiff should be awarded an order 
transferring said funds to the plaintiff in a sum not to exceed 
$100,000.00. However, said order shall not be effective until 
May 19> 1986, in order to give the defendant an opportunity to 
have a hearing in the Federal lawsuit which has been filed in 
connection with this matter* 
6. That the issue raised in the plaintiff's Order to 
Show Cause requiring the defendant to assume legal defenses on 
the lawsuits being brought as a result of the debts incurred 
during the marriage and the awarding of attorney's fees incurred 
in the defense to the date of this hearing is reserved to be 
handled by Brief on the part of the parties. The Court does find 
that Attorney Hobert A. Echard has incurred attorney's fees in 
the sum of $1,900.00 in defending lawsuits brought by First 
Security Bank, by Jacqueline Jackson, and by Mark J. Benson 
against the defendants. 
3 
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7. That the plaintiff has incurred attorney's fees for 
defending the defendant's Motion for a New Trial and for this 
Order to Show Cause and various hearings in the sum of $750 •00 
and should be granted a judgment against the defendant in the sum 
of $750.00. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the plaintiff should be awarded a judgment for 
delinquent child support in the sum of $217.00. 
2. That the defendant shall return the children after 
having visitation rights with them at the times originally 
ordered by the Court and if the defendant fails to pick up the 
children within one hour of the time specified in said order, the 
plaintiff may assume he will not exercise his visitation for that 
period. 
That . the 
y>ney| 
t'rket account in the sum 
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pension and profit sharing plan if necessary, within 30 days 
which shall be by May 21, 1986. 
4. That the plaintiff should be awarded the ownership of 
the moneys presently held in the Merrill Lynch Money Market 
account in the name of Barry Koerpel in a sum not to exceed 
$100,000.00 provided said order shall not become effective until 
May 19, 1986. 
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5. That the plaintiff sliuuld bu—arw "krded a judgment for 
attorney1 s fees for appearing on the motion for a new trial and 
this Order to Show Cause in the sum of $750.00. 
6. That the issues pertaining whether or not the 
defendant shall assume and defend the plaintiff on lawsuits 
arising out of debts incurred during their marriage and whether 
or not the plaintiff should be awarded attorney's fees incurred 
in the defense of those actions to date in the sum of $1,900.00 
shall be reserved and briefed by the parties. 
ORDER 
1* That the plaintiff is awarded a judgment in said 
delinquent child support in the sum of $217»00. 
2. That the defendant is ordered to comply with the 
previous Divorce Decree Order pertaining to visitation and to 
return the children at the time specified therein; and if the 
defendant fails to pick up the children within one hours of the 
time specified in said order then the plaintiff may assume the 
defendant will not exercise his visitation for that visitation 
period. 
3» That the defendant is held in contempt of Court fo h\ 
0vQ^ro~frh-»-.^ainti^ 
defendant is to Jake- whatever actions are necessary to transfer 
said moneys, including terminating the pension and profit sharing 
plan if necessary, within 30 days which shall be by May 21, 1986. 
4. That the plaintiff is awarded the ownership of the 
moneys presently held in the Merrill Lynch Money Market account 
5 
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in the name of Barry Koerpel in a sum not to exceed $100,000.00 
provided said order shall not become effective until May 19> 
1986. 
5* That the plaintiff is awarded a judgment for 
attorney1 s fees for appearing on the motion for a new trial and 
this Order to Show Cause in the sum of $750.00* 
6. That the issues pertaining whether or not the 
defendant shall assume and defend the plaintiff on lawsuits 
arising out of debts incurred during their marriage and whether 
or not the plaintiff should be awarded attorney1s fees incurred 
in the defense of those actions to date in the sum of $1,900.00 
shall be reserved and briefed by the parties. 
DATED this day of May, 1986. 
. ROTH, District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order was mailed, 
postage prepaid, this X*"d., of May, 1986, to Ronald E. 
Nehring, Attorney for Defendant, 424 East 500 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111. 
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